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Content of the lecture 
Specificity of Nuclear Trade Rules :  
 Why does nuclear trade derogate from 
general trade rules ? 
Trade Control Rules : 
 - International trade (export) control regime 
 - European Union trade control regime 
Case study 
1. Specificity of Nuclear 
Trade Rules : 
 Why does nuclear trade 
derogate from general trade 
rules ? 
 
A. General International Trade 
Principle 
Principle :  International trade exchanges 
should flow as smoothly, predictably 
and freely as possible  
 Within the guidelines defined by WTO 
(GATT, GATTS, TRIPS agreements) 
Derogations : Strictly defined, exceptional 
and ruled by international agreements 
Derogations could be allowed for 
- Economic reasons : 
 Safeguard the balance of payments, prevent 
sudden increases in imports from causing 
serious injury to domestic producers,…. 
- Non-economic reasons : 
 Necessity to protect public morals or 
protect human, animal or plant life or 
health,… and  
For security reasons  
Article XXI of GATT establishes five 
exceptions for security reasons and related to: 
 - Information 
 - UN embargoes 
 - War and emergency 
 - Arms and related items 
 - Nuclear materials 
1. United Nations embargoes 
exception 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(c)      to prevent any contracting party from 
taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Charter of the United Nations   
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security 
Article 40 
The Security Council may decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it 
may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations 
List of countries under embargoes 
decided by the UN Security Council 
 Libya, Belarus, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, 
Burma Myanmar (Burma), Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Croatia, 
Somalia, Haiti, Sudan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Ivory 
Coast, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea), Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Yugoslavia 




Items covered by UN embargoes could be 
rather different: 
- Embargo on arms and related materials 
- Ban on exports of equipment for internal 
repression 
- Ban on provision of certain services 
- Restrictions on admission 
- Freezing of funds and economic resources of 
certain persons who constitute a threat to the 





Example : Resolution 1718 (2006) on 
People’s Democratic Republic of North 
Korea 
8. Decides that: 
(a) All Member States shall prevent the 
direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer 
to the DPRK, through their territories or 
by their nationals, or using their flag 
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not 
originating in their territories, of: 
 
(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and 
technology as set out in the lists in documents S/
2006/814 (NSG trigger and dual-use lists) and S/
2006/815 (MTCR list), unless within 14 days of 
adoption of this resolution the Committee has 
amended or completed their provisions also taking 
into account the list in document S/2006/816 
(Australia Group list), as well as other items, 
materials, equipment, goods and technology, 
determined by Security Council or the Committee, 
which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, 
ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass 
destruction- related programmes; 
2. Arms and related items exception 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any 
action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests  
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other 
goods and materials as is carried on directly 
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a 
military establishment;   
- Used by the United States at the 
beginning of the Cold War in order 
to impose an embargo on export of 
strategic goods (200 entries) to 
Czechoslovakia 
- Ground for Wassenaar Arrangement, 
MTCR, Australia Group Zangger, 
NSG trade control lists 
3. Nuclear materials exception 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking 
any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security 
interests  
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the 
materials from which they are derived;  
Two potential interpretations 
- Minimum : authorise only “national 
security essential interests” related 
restrictions 
 Nuclear trade could be restricted for 
“non-proliferation concerns” 
- Maximum : authorise all nuclear trade 
derogations 
 Nuclear trade could be limited to 
assurance/protection of national energy 
needs 
B. International Nuclear 
Trade Principle 
The general trade principle is overturned 
- Principle : Prohibition 
- Trade : Exception 
All nuclear transfers shall be submitted to 
(trade) authorisation 
- Might even lead to prohibition of specific 
technologies : suppliers “should 
restrain themselves” from transferring 
some “sensitive technologies”  
Why is it so ? 
Nuclear trade is … Victim of the Original Sin 
First large developments of nuclear applications 
were dedicated to the elaboration of an 
explosive device 
US Manhattan project 
Consequence: nuclear technology has been 
essentially considered as military 
technology rather than as technology with 
essentially peaceful applications 
1946 : US imposed a trade prohibition 
on all nuclear technologies 
Adoption in July 1946 of the Atomic 
Energy Act  (McMahon Act) establishing 
a program restricting the dissemination 
of information inside and outside the 
country 
Motivation : if potential peaceful 
application of nuclear physics could be 
developed, it could not be split from 
military one 
Nevertheless US prohibition regime appeared 
rapidly to be : 
1. Ineffective to counter nuclear weapons proliferation 
US principal political competitors and allies have 
succeeded to elaborate and test a nuclear explosive 
device (USSR 49, UK 52)  
2. Politically damageable 
Soviet Union was developing  peaceful applications 
and was ready to share them with its allies 
3. Commercially damageable 
Conditions of supply required by States developing 
their civil nuclear programs were less constraining than 
those imposed to US industries 
  Production of isotopes for medical use 
1953: US reversed its restrictive nuclear 
trade policy (Atoms for Peace Plan) 
Principle : International exchange of nuclear 
technology is possible IF and ONLY the use of 
fissile materials produced or transferred is subject to 
constant/regular verifications 
 
Atoms for Peace has opened access to (US) peaceful 
nuclear applications in exchange of the submission 
by the end-user of adequate safeguards assumed by 
the supplier State or by an international organisation 
 Between 1956 and 1962 research reactors, training 
and fissile materials have been provided to 26 
countries 
Difficulties raised by new sharing policy 
initiated by Atoms for Peace Plan 
Absence of common guidelines and conditions of 
supply required by different suppliers regarding 
- Safeguards; 
- Criteria; 
- The list of goods and technologies. 
Therefore India, Israel, China, … were supplied by 
different States under different conditions  of 
supply 
 
Balancing the sharing policy through 
Multilateral Export Control Regime 
Avoiding the risk that US technologies might be 
transferred directly or indirectly to a 
Warsaw Pact member or another 
sensitive country, like China 
The establishment  of a multilateral export 
control regime was suggested to NATO 
members  
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls (COCOM) was created 
in 1950 
The main objective was to ban the export of 
sensitive items to Warsaw Pact 
members and China 
 Items which could make a significant 
contribution to the military or economic 
potential of the importing country 
Derogation would have to be authorised by 
consensus of all States Parties 
 





Export control regime  is one of the three 
houses: Straw, Sticks and Bricks 
The wolf is the proliferator 
 
 
The pigs are … the list of nuclear 
materials, equipments and 
technologies  
Once upon the time …the 
COCOM (1956)  
Adopted the so-called “strategic list” which 
included a list of nuclear items 
submitted to export authorisation  
Covered material, equipment and technology  
“especially designed” or “designed” 
for the use of nuclear energy 
 
Nevertheless, China succeeded to build a 
nuclear weapon 
The house of sticks :  NPT (1968)  and 
Zangger Committee (1974) 
Adopted a list of nuclear materials, 
equipments and technologies 
(especially designed for), the export 
thereof will trigger a requirement of 
safeguards by the supplier 
 
But India, Israel succeeded to build nuclear 
weapons 
The house of bricks : The Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (1978) 
- Some suppliers have not signed or ratified the NPT 
- Not politically bound by Zangger list of nuclear 
materials, equipments and technologies 
- Creation of Group of Nuclear Suppliers States with 
no direct link with NPT and adoption of the 
same list that the one of the Zangger 
Committee 
But disclosure of Iraqi nuclear weapons research 
program at the end of the first Gulf War 
 
The house of …. steal: The Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (1992) 
Adoption of new list of items : “dual-use items” 
Equipment, material and technology which have 
both nuclear and non-nuclear applications 
and could make a significant contribution to 
an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or 
nuclear explosive 
 The list was adopted by the NSG in 1992 and by 




But new nuclear proliferation 
concerns have been raised since the 
adoption of the dual-use list by the 
NSG: 
 
And what if fundamental principles on 
which nuclear export control regimes 
were based are not adequate to fight 
the nuclear weapons proliferation? 
The pig watched his two friends run into the surf with boards made of 
straw and sticks. Later however, his smug sense of security - 
along with his board of bricks - vanished in about 40 feet of 
water. 
Controlling non-listed items 
List approach to control nuclear trade have shown its 
limits : 
- Number of entries could not be extended 
indefinitely 
- Comprehensive list could not be fully implemented 
by National Authorities 
- Lengthy delays for updating the lists 
Lists are often below the last level of technology 
development  
- Between 6 and 12 months to obtain a consensus and 
a few more to implement it at the national level 
 
How ? Through catch-all clauses  
Principle : focusing on the final/potential end-
users more than on item itself 
- In its common use, the item does not present a 
high proliferation risk but in certain cases 
it could contribute to a WMD program; 
- Requiring an authorisation for all exports 
would be useless due to the number of 
transactions; 
- Export authorisation would be required only 




Two potential levels: 
Catch-all I requires an authorisation for the transfer of 
non-listed items when the exporter is informed 
by its competent National Authorities that the 
items in question may be intended, in their 
entirety or part, for use in connection with 
nuclear weapons research program 
Catch-all II and III require that if the exporter is 
aware or has grounds for suspecting that non-
listed items are intended to contribute to nuclear 
weapons activities; he must notify his 
authorities which will decide whether or not it 
is expedient to make the export concerned 
subject to authorisation 
2. Trade Control Rules : 
 International Trade (Export) 
Control Regime(s) 
 
Elements of Trade Control Regime  
Preliminary Remarks: 
Nuclear Export Control Regime is largely governed by 
informal regulations (soft law) 
 - One/two formal international acts : NPT, 
   UNSCR 1540 and 1887 
 - Several informal acts: Zangger Committee, NSG, 
  Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR 
Difficulty: Political commitment usually requires an 
adoption of national regulation instruments to 
implement it. Always a risk of an incomplete 
implementation or an “à la carte” 
implementation 
Nuclear Trade Control Regime : Mix of 
International, Regional and National 
legislations and bodies 
 
- NPT, NSG Guidelines, UNSCR, 
European Regulations, National 
Regulations and sometimes Sub-
national Regulations 
- Security Council, IAEA, European 
Institutions, National Authorities,… 
Trade Control Regime should normally 
integrate three elements: 
1.  Authorisation system to analyse the 
export/transit/import applications 
2.  Control and verification system to 
verify the end-users and the use of the 
items transferred 
3.  Sanctions to penalise infringements  
What do we have ? 
-  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Cornerstone of the regime 
- UNSC 1540, 1977 and 1887 
Called for the establishment of an efficient national export control 
regime 
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): 
- Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1) 
- Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 
Materials, Software, and Related Technology 
(INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part.2) 
- Zangger Committee 
Guidelines for nuclear transfers (Trigger List: INFCIRC/209/Rev.2) 
- Wassenaar Arrangement 
- Guidelines and procedures 
- List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
The  Resolution 1540 (2004)  
Adopted by the Security Council  
on 28 April 2004 
Principles 
- Adopted to reinforce international and 
national instruments to counter the risk of 
WMD acquisition by non-state actors 
 Not specifically dedicated to nuclear and 
nuclear-related items 
- Resolution established mostly two 
categories of constraints for Member 
States :  
   
1.WMD non-proliferation commitment 
 1. All States shall refrain from providing 
any form of support to non-State actors that 
attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, 
possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery 
- Essentially a principle 
  Does not define how it should be implemented 
(conditions, criteria) 
- Focus on Non-State Actors (in contrast to the NPT) 
 Defined as: individual or entity, not acting under 
the lawful authority of any State in conducting 
activities which come within the scope of this 
resolution 
- Concerns all WMD and missiles  
 Defined as: missiles, rockets and other unmanned 
systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons, that are specially designed for 
such use 
2. Commitments to elaborate an appropriate 
National Export Control Regime 
« All States, in accordance with their national procedures, 
shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws 
which prohibit any non-State actor » to elaborate 
WMD  « in particular for terrorist purposes, as well 
as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing 
activities, participate in them as an accomplice, 
assist or finance them » 
« All States shall take and enforce effective measures to 
establish domestic controls to prevent the 
proliferation » of WMD, « including by establishing 
appropriate controls over related materials » 
Appropriate effective laws 
Controlling export, transit, transhipment and 
re-export and controls on providing 
funds and services related, appropriate 
criminal or civil penalties for violations 
Domestics control measures  
Physical protection, accounting system, end-
user controls, border controls, law 
enforcement   
 
Does not establish lists of items to be control  
 But national control lists shall include nuclear, 
chemical, biological especially designed items 
and related materials (dual-use items) including 
their means of delivery 
Peer review process to evaluate the implementation 
of the Resolution  
- 1540 Committee (mandate has been renewed for ten 
years) 




The  Resolution 1887 (2009)  
Adopted by the Security Council  
on 24 September 2009 (not under 
Chapter VII) 
Principles 
- Reinforce UNSCR 1540 principles 
- Broader field of implementation concerns All situation 
of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations 
 Not limited to Non-State Actors 
 - Focuses essentially on nuclear non-proliferation  
 - Encourages States to adopt stricter national controls for 
the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the 
nuclear fuel cycle   
 Sensitive goods are not defined by the Resolution, 
therefore could be understood through the NSG 
understanding  : reprocessing, enrichment? 
 
Introduces “UN criteria/condition of 
supply”  
1. Supplier’s right to require the return of the items 
transferred if safeguards could not be applied 
Supplier shall require as a condition of nuclear exports 
that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it 
should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the 
IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with 
its IAEA safeguards agreement, the supplier state would 
have a right to require the return of nuclear material and 
equipment provided prior to such termination, non-




2. Requiring the additional protocol 
Encourages States to consider whether a 
recipient State has signed and ratified 
an additional protocol based on the 
model additional protocol in making 




3. Requiring continuous safeguards 
 Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear 
exports that the recipient State agree that, in the 
event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards 
agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect 
to any nuclear material and equipment provided 
prior to such termination, as well as any special 
nuclear material produced through the use of such 
material or equipment; 
Export control 
commitments required 
by the NPT 
Export of nuclear equipment and technology is 
essentially governed by one provision  
 (Article III.2) : 
NPT Parties take a commitment not to provide:  
(a) source or special fissionable material, or 
(b) equipment or material especially designed or 
prepared for the processing, use or production 
of special fissionable material,  
to any non-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS) for 
peaceful purposes, unless the source or special 
fissionable material shall be subject to the 
safeguards required by this Article  
What does it mean ? 
 
Article III.2 establishes two commitments to be 
implemented by the supplier State : 
1. To control the transfer to NNWS (as defined by 
article IX.3) of a undefined list of items 
2. To submit the export of nuclear items to the 
condition that fissile materials, being used 
in the facilities where the items are to be  
transferred, would be submitted to 
safeguards 
Article III as interpreted by NPT Review 
Conferences (2000, 2010)  
 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has 
been indirectly considered as the one required 
by article III.2 
… transfer of source or special fissionable 
material or equipment or material … to non-
nuclear-weapon States should require, as a 
necessary precondition, acceptance of the 
comprehensive IAEA safeguards  
Not yet the Additional Protocol even if  
…The Conference notes that many States 
recognize that comprehensive safeguards 
agreements and additional protocols are 
among the integral elements of the IAEA 
safeguards system. 
- Transferred should not be allowed unless 
the recipient State has contraint itselfs with 
an internationally legally binding 
commitments not to acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.  
 
- Items controlled do not include nuclear-
related dual-use items nevertheless such 
items : are relevant to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and therefore to the 
Treaty as a whole. The Conference calls 
upon all States parties to ensure that their 
exports of nuclear-related dual-use items 
to States not party to the Treaty do not 
assist any nuclear- weapons programme  
 
To clarify article III.2 NPT commitments 
some States Parties established an 
informal instrument known as Zangger 
Committee (1978) 
 - Adopted a list of materials, equipments 
and technologies (INFCIRC/209) 
 - Defined that IAEA safeguards 
required by Article III of the NPT are 
those defined by the INFCIRC/153 also 
called Comprehensive Safeguards 
Commitments imposed by 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
Principal informal instrument regarding the control 
of nuclear transfers 
 Includes all major potential suppliers, except 
India, Israel and Pakistan 
Not an international nuclear export control regime but 
establishes a common understanding of 
export control principles that each participating 
State shall introduce into its national export 
control regime 
Two set of Guidelines have been adopted: 
 Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers 
 Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related 
Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and 
Related Technology  
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers apply to  
- Nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to 
any non-nuclear weapon State 
- Nuclear retransfers to any State 
 
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
Related Dual-Use Items apply to 
- Dual-use transfers and retransfers to any 
State 
NSG Field of Implementation 
Two control lists  
1. Items that are especially designed or prepared for 
nuclear use (trigger list):  
- Nuclear material; 
- Nuclear reactors and equipment therefor, non-
nuclear material for reactors; 
- Plant and equipment for the reprocessing, 
enrichment and conversion of nuclear 
material and for fuel fabrication and heavy 
water production and; 
- Technology associated with each of the 
abovementioned items; 
2. Nuclear related dual-use items and 
technologies : items that can make a major 
contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel 
cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which 
have as well non-nuclear uses in chemical 
industry … 
 6 categories : Industrial equipment, Materials, 
Uranium isotope separation equipment and 
components, Heavy water production plant 
related equipment, Test and measurement 
equipment for the development of nuclear 
explosive devices, Components for nuclear 
explosive devices 
 
Since 2008, a fundamental review of the 
Trigger and Dual-use lists has been initiated 
 
The process is still ongoing and the last 
Plenary took all ready stock of the work 
achieved 
One Catch-all  
Includes only the principle 
established by the Guidelines and 
concerns items potentially related 




5. Suppliers should ensure that their 
national legislation requires an 
authorisation for the transfer of items not 
listed in the Annex if the items in question 
are or may be intended, in their entirety or 
in part, for use in connection with a 
“nuclear explosive activity.” 
Suppliers will implement such an 
authorisation requirement in accordance 
with their domestic licensing practices. 
Suppliers are encouraged to share 
information on “catch all” denials 
NSG Export Authorisation 
Fundamental principle : all 
items of the Trigger and Dual-use 
lists should be submitted to a 
national export authorisation 
  
Exception for “sensitive items” defined as 
“usable for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices,”  
- Has been reviewed in June 2011 to 
reinforce the conditions of supply 
- Transfers are not prohibited but suppliers 
“should exercise a policy of restraint ” 
 In particular, if denials have been 
issued for dual-use items by more 
than one NSG Member State 
To allow the transfer of sensitive items  the 
following criteria should be met :  
- NPT Party and is in full compliance with its obligations 
under the Treaty 
- has not been identified in a report by the IAEA Secretariat 
which is under consideration by the IAEA Board of 
Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to 
comply with its safeguards agreement…. 
- has adhering to the NSG Guidelines and has reported to the 
Security Council of the United Nations that it is 
implementing effective export controls as identified by 
Security Council Resolution  
- has concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the 
supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, 
effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer; 
Transfers of enrichment and 
reprocessing facility, equipment and 
technology are submitted to stricter 
conditions :  
- Prior to transfers enrichment or 
 reprocessing facilities, equipment or 
 technology, suppliers should consult 
 Participating Governments regarding the 
 non-proliferation related terms and 
 conditions applicable to the transfer. 
 
- Requirement of : 
 Legally-binding undertaking from the 
recipient State that neither the transferred 
facility, nor any facility incorporating such 
equipment or based on such technology, will 
be modified or operated for the production of 
greater than 20% enriched uranium 
- Recipients should be encouraged to accept as 
an alternative to national enrichment and 
reprocessing facility any other appropriate 
multinational participation in a resulting 
facility. 
NSG Export authorisation criteria 
Criteria for nuclear items (trigger list) :  
1. The non-proliferation principle  
Suppliers should authorise the transfer only 
when they are satisfied that it would not 
contribute to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons or any other nuclear explosive 
devices or to an act of nuclear terrorism 
Principle was largely criticised by non-
participating States due to its “subjective” 
aspect   
2. Restrain the transfer of items :  
If there are potential risks of retransfer due to 
the failure by the recipient State to develop and 
maintain appropriate, effective national export 
and transhipment controls as identified by 
UNSCR 1540 
NSG criteria for transfers of dual-use 
items 
- Recipient is party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to a 
similar international legally binding 
nuclear non-proliferation agreement, 
and has an IAEA safeguards 
agreement in force applicable to all 
peaceful nuclear activities;  
- Recipient is not  party to the NPT and 
has facilities subject or not to IAEA 
safeguards;  
- Items transferred are appropriate for 
the stated end use and whether that 
stated end use is appropriate for the 
end-user; 
- Items linked to reprocessing or 
enrichment facility; 
- Recipient State’s support of nuclear 
non-proliferation and Recipient 
State’s compliance with its 
international obligations in the field 
of non-proliferation;  
- Recipients have been engaged in clandestine or 
illegal procurement activities; 
- Transfer was not authorised to the end-user or 
whether the end-user has diverted for 
purposes inconsistent with the Guidelines 
any transfer previously authorised; 
- Risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism; 
- Risks of retransfer due to the failure by the 
Recipient State to develop and maintain 
appropriate, effective national exports and 
transhipment controls as identified by 
UNSCR 1540; 
Conditions to authorise the transfer 
(trigger list) 
1. Formal governmental assurances from the 
recipients explicitly excluding any use which 
would result in any nuclear explosive device 
 2. Recipient State should have brought into force 
an agreement with the IAEA requiring the 
application of CSA (not yet the Additional 
protocol) 
 Two complementary formal governmental 
         assurances should be provided by the    
         Recipient State in case of the CSA would be 
 terminated 
 1. If CSA should be terminated the Recipient will 
bring into force an agreement with the IAEA 
requiring the application of safeguards; 
 2. If the IAEA decides that the application of 
IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, 
appropriate verification measures should be 
elaborated. 
  
If the Recipient does not accept these measures, it 
should allow at the request of the Supplier the 
restitution of transferred and derived trigger list 
items 
Exceptions (nuclear trigger 
list items) 
1. Grandfather clause: Supplier’s 
commitments linked to contracts 
signed before its NSG 
membership 
2. Safety clause : transfers to a non-nuclear-
weapon State when they are deemed essential 
for the safe operation of existing facilities and 
only if safeguards are applied to those facilities  
 - Should be exceptional 
 - Before granting such authorisation Suppliers 
should inform and, if appropriate, consult in 
case if they intend to authorise or to deny such 
transfers  
Used twice by Russia in 2001 and 2006 
Other conditions supply (trigger list) 
2. Submission of government-to-government 
assurances requiring similar export condition of 
supply:  
- In case of retransfer of items originally exported  
- In case of transfer of items derived from facilities 
originally transferred, or with the help of 
equipment or technology originally transferred 
by the supplier (Contamination principle) 
 Mechanism similar but not equivalent to the 
US De Minimis Clause  
3. Submission of government-to-government 
assurances that the prior consent of the 
Supplier will be required: 
 
In case of retransfer or transfer of items derived 
from items originally transferred : 
 - to States which do not require CSA as a condition 
 of supply; 
 - and related to enrichment, reprocessing, heavy 
 water production or material usable for 
 nuclear weapons. 
 
Conditions to authorise the transfer  
(dual-use) 
- A statement from the end-user specifying the 
use and the end use location of the 
proposed transfers; 
- An assurance explicitly stating that the 
proposed transfer or any replica thereof will 
not be used in any nuclear explosive 
active or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle 
activity; 
- An assurance that the prior consent of the 
supplier will be required before 
transferring any dual-use item to a State 
not adhering to the Guidelines; 
- No undercut principle: A transfer should 
not be authorised if an “essentially 
identical” transfer has been denied by 
another State without consulting the 
State that has issued the denial. 
Sanctions (trigger list Guidelines) 
Consultation mechanism between Participating States in 
case of doubt on violation of the supplier/recipient 
understanding of the Guidelines 
 Explosion of a nuclear device, illegal termination or 
violation of IAEA safeguards,… 
Possibilities to suspend transfers of trigger list items to 
States in breach of theirs safeguards obligations 
 The suspension could be decided from the first IAEA 
investigation in case of suspicion of serious breaches 
of safeguards obligations 
The Indian exception:  
when the exception denies 
the rule 
Established formally by INFCIRC/734(corrected) 
The decision adopted at the extraordinary plenary session 
of September 6th, 2008 authorises NSG States 
Parties to export to India trigger list and dual-use 
items 
At each plenary Participating States have to notify 
approved transfers to India of trigger list items 
(not dual-use) 
Participating States could also inform other Participating 
States of their bilateral  nuclear cooperation 
agreements concluded with India 
 Presently following States have concluded nuclear 
agreements with India: Argentina, Republic of 
Korean, USA, France, Russia, Canada, Japan, 
Kazakhstan  
In exchange of an access to nuclear technology, 
India commits itself to: 
- Separate civilian nuclear facilities from military 
ones; 
- Conclude a CSA (including the Additional 
protocol) with the IAEA for the application of 
safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities; 
- Abstain from transfers of enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies to States that do not 
have them and support international efforts to 
limit their spread; 
- Institute a national export control system capable 
of effective control of multilaterally controlled 
nuclear and nuclear related items; 
- Harmonise its export control regime with the 
Guidelines of the NSG (including adherence 
to these Guidelines); 
- Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
testing and its readiness to work towards the 
conclusion of an FMCT 
NPT requirements and India	

India : 
- Not a NPT legally recognised Nuclear Weapons 
State as defined by Article IX 
No possibility to establish a tailor-made safeguards 
agreement similar to these applicable to Nuclear 
Weapons States 
China (INFCIRC/369), Russia (INFCIRC/327), 
France (INFCIRC/290), UK (INFCIRC/263),  
USA (INFCIRC/288) 
CSA requirement for any transfer 
from any NPT State Party  
 
CSA is based on the principle that all nuclear 
facilities and not only a specific list provided by 
the end-user shall be submitted to safeguards 
Before 1995 transfers to India were authorised if 
covered by dedicated safeguards agreement 
(INFCIRC/66) 
UNSCR 1887 requirements and India	

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply 
fully with all their obligations and fulfil 
their commitments under the Treaty; 
4. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to 
the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-
nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its 
universality at an early date, and pending 




“Consistency is contrary to nature, 
contrary to life. The only completely 
consistent people are the 
dead” (Aldous Huxley) 
